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BOOK REVIEWS
By John P. MacKenzie. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons. 1974. Pp. 241. $8.95.

THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE.

Reviewed by William K. Slate, 11*
...

[T]o perform its high function in the best way, 'justice must satisfy

the appearance of justice.' " This theme resounds throughout the book
born of that phrase. The ethical conduct of judges, primarily those of the
federal judiciary, is examined by the author from a posture which is basically non-political. In so doing, the author scrutinizes judicial conduct in
detail, from the denial of the position of Chief Justice to then Associate
Justice Abe Fortas, to the questionable propriety of Justice Rehnquist
sitting in Branzburg v. Hayes and Laird v. Tatum, 2 because of his alleged
pre-judgments. The lobbying efforts of certain Justices and Chief Justices
on behalf of legislation pending before Congress are examined in light of
professional as well as personal ethics. Similarly, the fitness of extrajudicial involvement by judges in a variety of roles is considered: when they
serve as advisors to Presidents, as a chief prosecutor of the Nuremberg
trials, and as the chairman of a commission investigating the assassination
of a President. MacKenzie discusses the inner workings of two institutions
as they pertain to judicial ethics: the Judicial Conference of the United
States and the American Bar Association. The former is the administrative
clearinghouse and policymaking body of the federal court system. The
Chief Justice is the Conference chairman. The Conference members include the chief judges of the eleven circuits, eleven district court judges
elected by the judges of their respective circuits, and the chief judges of
the United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals. Among the Conference's concerns is the subject of
ethics. The American Bar Association's Special Committee on Standards
of Judicial Conduct is lightly scorched for its failure, in the author's view,
to provide sufficiently strict canons of judicial ethics.
From the outset, MacKenzie acknowledges that corrupt judges are rare
fellows and that the majority of American federal judges are honest, able,
and desirous of discharging the duties of their office justly. It is also con* Clerk of Court, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; B.A., Wake Forest
University, 1965; J.D., T.C. Williams School of Law, 1968.
1. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11,

14 (1948).
2. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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ceded that ethical and behavioral considerations are not the whole of judging. However, in describing the courtroom conduct of Judges Harold R.
Medina and Julius J. Hoffman, in two trials noted for their uproariousness,3 the author makes a case that conduct is inextricably a paramount
part of the whole of judging.
A practice familiar to every attorney is attacked in a chapter entitled
The Velvet Blackjack.4 The title describes a situation where a judge has
an interest in a case which he has been assigned to hear. One hypothetical
case offered is where there is an insubstantial ownership of stock by the
judge in one of the companies which is a party to the proceeding. The judge
makes his interest known and inquires of counsel as to their objection to
his continuing to sit. In paraphrasing John P. Frank, the author maintains
that the velvet blackjack of subtle coercion has now been wielded-the
inference being that if counsel objects and requests the judge to recuse
himself, a vengeful judge may, in future cases, see that counsel many times
over regret their objection.
The author, in assessing both the appearance and the reality of judicial
integrity, distills into his book over a decade of experience5 as a court
reporter for The Washington Post. In chapters unconnected but for the
ethical thread, the book combines, often with historical references, an
outsider's independence with knowledge gleaned from inside exposure.
One such successfully developed historical case establishes that ethical
standards have indeed changed. Therefore, in light of today's standards,
some past judges' conduct may be termed scandalous: note that of the first
Chief Justice, John Jay, in negotiating a treaty with Great Britain while
holding judicial office, or that of John Marshall in judging the legality of
commissions he had signed as a cabinet official, while rendering his opinion in Marbury v. Madison.' In a situation of more recent vintage, Justice
Blackmun has concluded that his conduct, while a circuit judge, of sitting
in four cases involving corporations in which he held stock, would not meet
the requisites of the stricter standard required today. At his Senate confirmation hearings, Blackmun described the practice of his circuit that allowed a judge to sit in cases of so-called "insubstantial stock holdings" if
the jurists disclosed their interests to each other.
3. United States v. Sacher, 9 F.R.D. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d
345 (7th Cir. 1972).
4. J. MAcKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSnCE 95 (1974).

5. In 1969 MacKenzie won the American Bar Association's Gavel Award for Supreme Court
coverage the previous year.
6. 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368 (1803).
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Although MacKenzie endeavors to be fair in judging the conduct of
others, he is shackled at times by a subjectivity that results in an overextensive treatment of less serious incidents. Such inordinate treatment,
indeed the greater part of a chapter,7 is devoted to the refusal by Justice
William H. Rehnquist to disqualify himself in the case of Laird v. Tatum.,
The Tatum case raised the question of whether antiwar groups and pacifists could sue the government over the Army's program of surveillance,
intelligence gathering, infiltration, and dissemination of information to
other federal agencies. It was suggested on petition for rehearing before the
Supreme Court, and reiterated by the author, that Justice Rehnquist
should have disqualified himself "because of his role as principal administration defender and witness at extensive hearings on military surveillance
held before [Senator Sam] Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights. There Rehnquist stated that the Pentagon program, however unwise or regrettable, did not violate anyone's constitutional rights."'
Rehnquist even went on to say that the Tatum lawsuit was not justiciable.
MacKenzie explains that these were the very issues when the case reached
the Supreme Court. For his refusal to recuse himself from sitting on the
Tatum case, the author indicts the Justice for "one of the most serious
ethical lapses in the Court's history."" MacKenzie, however, discounts too
hastily and with insufficient consideration Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opinion
in the Tatum case, in which he discussed the statute which governs the
propriety of his sitting, 28 U.S.C. § 455. Rehnquist concluded that because
"he never participated, either of record or in any advisory capacity, in the
District Court, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court in the
government's conduct of the case of Laird v. Tatum'.

.

.

,"

and since he

had neither been counsel nor a material witness, the governing statute
which would demand disqualification was not applicable. The Justice
added that it would be not merely unusual, but extraordinary, if a Justice
came to the Supreme Court without having expressed opinions on constitutional issues in his prior legal career. "Proof," he said, "that a Justice's
mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the
area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.""2 MacKenzie continues his attack by taking exception to Justice Rehnquist's rather summary dismissal of the American Bar
7. J. MAcKENziE,supra note 4, at 207.
8. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
9. J. MAcKENZIE, supra note 4, at 213.
10. Id. at 209.
11. 409 U.S. 824, 828 (1972).
12. J. MACKENZm, supra note 4, at 220.
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Association's Code of Judicial Conduct, which admonishes in Canon Two
that a judge should avoid even the appearance of impropriety in his activities. In fact, the discretion as to whether or not to sit is entrusted to the
judiciary; Rehnquist acknowledged his duty under the statute and then
published his reasons for his course of action.
In the area of so-called judge lobbying in behalf of legislation on Capitol
Hill, the judiciary is taken to task for a number of instances in which they
purp6rtedly overstepped the boundaries of their branch of government. Yet
Congress often needs and seeks the expertise of judges in matters ranging
from judicial administration and prison reform to habeas corpus rights.
"Social policy" is the term MacKenzie gives to areas deemed improper for
judicial lobbying. Identification of such areas, however, is clearly a matter
of judgment in most cases. It is noteworthy that though the judiciary is
cautioned to "stick to judging," the author recommends that Congress
enact legislation regulating judicial ethics. Admittedly Congress has the
authority to establish and abolish the lower federal courts.13 Notwithstanding, the setting of ethical standards for a coordinate branch of government
may provide room for the view that the legislature is improperly intruding
into the judiciary.
Is there a crisis of public confidence in the judiciary in America? Unfortunately, this book was printed before the Supreme Court ruled on the
President's tapes in August of 1974.14 Thus, a significant addendum would
appear to "be in order. There are over 500 federal judges in the United
States. Both ethical precepts and the appearance of justice, ably examined
by MacKenzie, are arguably violated by only a minuscule sample of judicial conduct. Generalizations, vis A vis the entire profession, do not logically follow. Likewise, the author's more extreme remedies, such as requiring judges and Justices to report their debts, appear unwarranted at this
time. Finally, the author, by a combination of recommendations, would
restrict off the bench activities and public speaking by judges. A semimonastic existence, however, is not required to achieve justice, nor even
the appearance of justice.
13. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. I, § 1.
14. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. -,

94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).

SERVING JUSTICE.

By J. Harvie Wilkinson, III. New York: Charter House.

1974. Pp. 207. $7.95.
Reviewed by W. Gibson Harris*
Jay Wilkinson is perhaps the outstanding Virginian of his age group. It
is difficult to imagine how any young man desiring to become part of the
main stream of American legal life could have better spent his formative
years. He was a Phi Beta Kappa and a Magna Cum Laude graduate of Yale
University, where he majored in history and made an in-depth study of the
politics of his native state. In 1968, while attending the University of Virginia Law School, he received national acclaim for the publication of his
book entitled, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics. At
law school he was on the Law Review and was elected to the Order of the
Coif. In 1970 he was a Republican candidate for Congress from Virginia's
Third Congressional District and was appointed by then Governor Holton
as the youngest member of the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia. He is now serving at the University of Virginia as Assistant Professor
of Constitutional Law.
Following law school graduation Mr. Wilkinson sought the position of
law clerk to a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. After
interviewing Justices White and Stewart, he received an appointment from
the then new member of the Court from his own city of Richmond, Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Serving Justice is the story of Mr. Wilkinson's years as law clerk to
Justice Powell. The book is, by any standard, well written. A portion is in
the form of an historical autobiography and gives the highlights of events
in the Supreme Court during its 1971 and 1972 terms. But the book is much
more than merely a chronicle or summary of such events, for the author
reveals his personal feelings and professional thinking on the many subjects inevitably involved in his work and that of the Court. As Professor
John P. Frank points out in his Foreword, Mr. Wilkinson "brought to his
year in the Court diligence, perceptiveness and principle," personal qualities which shine throughout the volume. One of the merits of the book is
that it approaches the subject with respect and sensitivity, but without
sensationalism, and yet conveys in an intimate way the flavor of the Court
as it works from day to day.
The first part of the book is largely autobiographical, dealing with Mr.
Wilkinson's own experiences as a clerk. He does not hold these out as
*Partner, McGuire, Woods and Battle, Richmond, Virginia; A.B., Princeton University,
1939; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1942.
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necessarily typical of every clerk, but obviously there is much of general
application. Every Justice has a somewhat different concept of the proper
role of the clerks and the way in which he can obtain from them maximum
assistance. By relating the experiences and opinions of clerks for other
Justices, Mr. Wilkinson explores these differing concepts and views. This
portion will thus be interesting to everyone who wonders exactly what law
clerks do and where their influences stop. Mr. Wilkinson believes that with
most. Justices, and certainly with Justice Powell, there is no truth to the
suspicion occasionally voiced that the clerks determine the course of the
Court's decisions. And yet, we see plainly that law clerks have indeed
contributed greatly to the intellectual quality of the Court's efforts and
that the clerks are one of the Court's unique and indispensable assets.
These early chapters will enlighten law students considering applying for
similar positions and would appear instructive for all judges as to the use
of their law clerks.
The second section of the book concerns Justice Powell himself, as both
a man and a Justice. As with valets, historically law clerks have not always
ended their service with the highest regard for the man with whom they
have been in close association. We might expect the reverse here, where
the Justice had been a family friend and mentor of his youthful aide for
many years prior to their professional relationship, and indeed we do find
this clerk to have the highest regard for his Justice. On the evidence presented in these pages, as well as in the decisions already written by Justice
Powell and the positions taken by him on the Court, this judgment would
seem objectively justified and supported by the record.
The chapter on The Justice blends a warm personal insight with a
thoughtful judicial portrait of Justice Powell. Powell is seen as possessing
a model judicial temperament-a combination of balance, broad life experience and personal equanimity. He is presented as a human being who has
risen above the petty and vindictive emotions that consume so many in
public life and as having arrived at a mature vision of life in which human
dignity and responsibility, as twin virtues, are paramount. Mr. Wilkinson
thinks that one of Mr. Justice Powell's finest characteristics is his compassion and his feeling for people as individuals. Perhaps the most impressive
evidence cited in the book on this is the testimony given in favor of his
confirmation to the Court by a black woman who had worked with him in
establishing the OEO Legal Services Program, that "Lewis Powell is,
above all humane; that he has a capacity to empathize, to respond to the
plight of a single human being to a degree that transcends idealized or
fixed positions."
A second basic characteristic of the Justice, as seen by his clerk, is his
independence. To those who knew Mr. Powell before his elevation to the
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Court, this quality was well known, and it has been a source of satisfaction
and almost amusement to them to observe the nation become aware of this
quality as it has read his opinions and seen that the Justice's positions are
not foreordained by bias of region, background, or economic circumstance.
Mr. Wilkinson's pages cite chapter and verse, showing in how many cases
Justice Powell has already come to be perhaps the decisive element in
determining the Court's position in vital areas of the law. Certainly he has
not blindly cast votes with the other members of the Court who happen to
have been appointed by the same President.
Practicing lawyers will be particularly interested in the transition that
was involved in passing from a highly professional but non-specialized
practice in one of the outstanding law firms of the country, to a seat on
the Supreme Court. In the case of Justice Powell, this was a transition he
did not seek and one that he has said on many occasions he really did not
wish. The transition here, however, seems to have been made with the
Justice's usual good humor but only with a tremendous increase in his
personal work hours. The book brings out vividly the far lesser amount of
assistance that is available to a Supreme Court Justice than to a top
partner in almost any sizable American law firm. As in the case of Chief
Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Powell has spoken publicly on the need for
additional assistance of all kinds for each member of the Court, and bar
associations across the nation are lending their active support to have
Congress supply it.
Mr. Wilkinson does not in so many words term his mentor one of the
great Justices of the Court, but the facts marshalled in the volume, as well
as the record of Mr. Justice Powell's own writings and positions, point
clearly in that direction. Such a conclusion will come as no surprise to
those who worked closely with Mr. Powell before his elevation to the Court,
for as President Nixon said in announcing the appointment: "Everything
that Lewis F. Powell has undertaken he has accomplished with distinction
and honor."
The last portion of the book passes from a consideration of a single
Justice to a study of the Court as a whole. For the layman it describes the
place of this institution in the American political scene as well as in American life, and for the professional it gives keen insights into the reasoning
and positions of the individual members of the present Court.
Mr. Wilkinson, on the basis of his personal observations as well as his
studies in constitutional law, is a firm and deep supporter of the Supreme
Court, both as our court of final resort and as the most fascinating branch
of the American government. He feels strongly that it must remain a court
and not a political forum. This, he writes, can and will be done through
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the tradition that encourages the nine Justices to retain their independence and thereby preserve the institution's continuity. He understands
that the nature of any important Supreme Court decision is enormously
complex and, at the same time, "enormously vulnerable to oversimplification." He shows us that, even amidst radical changes of personnel, the Court remains sensitive to the continuous and evolutionary character of the law. He points out that the changes that have been brought
about by this Court have been far from the wholesale repeal of the work of
the Warren Court that had been expected in many quarters, and says that
as yet no significant Warren Court holdings in the field of criminal law
have been directly overruled. With perhaps a sly intendment, he adds that
this would appear "a major feat" since that Court itself overturned many
other pre-existing decisions.
The final pages of the book were composed, as Mr. Wilkinson describes
it, in "the autumn of Watergate." He deplores that then unravelling scandal, but even against that background he felt relieved to know that the
Supreme Court would carry on with an inner sense of integrity and a
commitment to the public trust. How wise he was! Since then we have read
the unanimous opinion of the Court that even the President of the United
States is not above the rule of the law.

